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Indications and warning intelligence is an important and time-tested
methodology employed by intelligence analysts to warn military officers
and policymakers about changes in an opponent’s operational ‘‘posture’’
which indicate that the likelihood of dangerous or aggressive activity is
increasing. In recent times, it has fallen out of fashion because
policymakers and the public alike have come to expect that the Intelligence
Community will be able to provide ‘‘specific event predictions’’ of an
opponent’s future actions. In other words, people tend to believe that
intelligence analysts should be able to state who is about to undertake
some unwanted activity, as well as where, how, when and why the action
will unfold.
Another expectation is that these specific event predictions will be offered
early enough so that policymakers and operators can take effective action to
prevent the occurrence of some nefarious act or attack. Specific event
prediction is indeed the ‘‘holy grail’’ of intelligence analysis, and analysts
sometimes do manage to warn of specific events before they unfold. In
1942 naval intelligence analysts predicted the Japanese attack on Midway.
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The Intelligence Community detected Soviet efforts to place medium range
missiles in Cuba before these actions became a fait accompli.1 But for
theoretical, bureaucratic, and cognitive reasons, specific event prediction is
extraordinarily difficult to achieve in practice. Success tends to be the
exception, not the norm.
Indications and warning intelligence offers a powerful and important
alternative to a focus on specific event prediction that might in fact be
better suited to contemporary threats posed by non-state actors or rogue
regimes. To be effective, however, both analysts and policymakers must
understand the philosophy and methodology that animates indications and
warning intelligence. They not only have to comprehend its strengths and
limitations, but they must also understand the part they have to play to
best utilize indications and warning intelligence to deter or defend against
an opponent’s pending initiatives.
INDICATIONS AND WARNING INTELLIGENCE DEFINED
Indications and warning intelligence is an effort to identify and monitor
changes in an opponent’s operational posture by assessing whether or not
the opponent’s military units or other types of operational capabilities are
in a ‘‘day alert’’ or ‘‘generated alert’’ status. Day alert represents a normal,
or peacetime, status in which assets are maintained in a routine posture
and are not highly capable of being used to conduct offensive operations
or even any significant operation at all. By definition, most military or
police units are usually in a day alert status—their activities are centered
on undertaking routine maintenance, training, or other activities required
to preserve the potential for real operations. Each organization also
possesses a unique day alert posture because bureaucratic procedures,
equipment maintenance demands, funding cycles and personnel practices
combine to create routines and patterns of activity that are not easily
broken. At any given moment in time, for instance, about two-thirds of
the ships in the U.S. Navy are in port undergoing routine maintenance or
major overhauls that are planned years in advance, which would suggest
that the day alert status of the U.S. Navy corresponds roughly to a
situation in which thirty percent of available assets at any given time are
deployed at sea and are capable of undertaking military operations.
In contrast, a generated alert status represents a break with this normal
peacetime pattern of activity. It constitutes a halt in routine and instead
focuses on making the largest possible force available to undertake
operations. Maintenance and other housekeeping measures are curtailed
and deferred as units take up attack positions or are otherwise postured to
undertake actual operations. The process of force generation generally
follows a bell curve—as a majority of a force is brought up to operational
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readiness, its capability tends to peak for a limited period of time and then
begins to diminish as deferred maintenance and other housekeeping
requirements tend to reduce operational capabilities. The decision to
generate forces thus implies real costs that will have to be paid in the form
of reduced operational capabilities in a future day alert posture since units
are then forced to complete deferred maintenance and other routine
matters that were ignored during the generated alert. The fact that the act
of generating forces is not without long-term operational costs and risks is
extraordinarily important because it ties the operational decision to
generate forces with the fundamental strategic and political calculations of
the government or non-state actor that places its units on a state of
maximum readiness.
The movement of forces from a day alert to a generated alert status often
creates a string of observable actions that can be detected by the collection
efforts of oppositional intelligence agencies. For military formations, leaves
are cancelled and reservists are mobilized, units depart bivouac and move
to staging areas, command and control networks are activated, and even
rumors about impending military action begin to circulate among civilian
populations and government agencies. In terms of non-state actors such as
criminal organizations or terrorist cells, deviations can be observed in what
constitutes normal activity as efforts begin to focus on launching
initiatives, not simply maintaining clandestine cells. Chatter on Internet-
enabled terrorist networks might increase as coded messages are relayed to
fellow travelers leaving them to prepare to face enhanced law enforcement
activities and making a break with ‘‘peacetime’’ command and control
procedures. Talk which can be picked up by informers might begin to
circulate within criminal or terrorist circles about the increased likelihood
that a major operation is about to unfold. Paradoxically, the very absence
of signals of normal activity can also suggest a sharp increase in
operational security that could indicate that military forces or terrorist and
criminal organizations are attempting to hide last minute preparations to
stage a significant operation. The absence of chatter on Internet networks
or indications that routine activities have been inexplicably curtailed can
serve as important signals that the opponent might be changing its
readiness posture. Both the presence of unique signals or the absence of
routine signals—the presence or absence of data—can serve as important
indicators that an opponent is moving from a day alert to a generated
alert status.
Indications and warning intelligence is thus focused on detecting changes
in the operational posture of the opponent in order to provide an alert
that the likelihood of dangerous or otherwise unwanted activity is
increasing. It is a continuous effort to reassess the likelihood of enemy
action over the short-to-medium term (days or several weeks). While not
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necessarily intended to estimate exactly what is about to unfold, it is instead
intended to warn policymakers, military and intelligence officers, and law
enforcement officials that the threat they face is increasing. In this sense, it
is not a single event prediction, but a risk assessment that can be used to
alert military forces to move to a heightened state of defensive alert or to
inform law enforcement officials that the time has arrived to implement
heightened security procedures. This type of information is crucial because
military organizations and law enforcement cannot indefinitely operate on
maximum defensive alert. Thus, indications and warning intelligence must
be tied to appropriate action on the part of the recipient in order to
increase defenses or security activities to meet an attack or, better yet, to
have a deterrent effect on the party contemplating some nefarious activity.
If the success of an attack depends on a complacent opponent, indications
and warning intelligence that is followed by a change in defensive posture
can deter or derail an attack or some other undesirable action.
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
During the Cold War, the U.S. Intelligence Community devoted vast
resources to monitor the status of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces
in an effort to provide warning of nuclear attack against the United States
and its allies or a Warsaw Pact offensive against the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). For individual analysts to be given responsibility
for the day-to-day monitoring of individual Soviet military formations or
key parts of its strategic nuclear force was not uncommon. Checklists were
drawn up to help analysts monitor routine ‘‘life-cycle events’’ (e.g.,
maintenance and training activities) so that anomalies in normal patterns
of activity could be identified for additional analysis. By subjecting
previous findings to continuous scrutiny, minor alterations in behavior
could be analyzed in the search for evidence of a gradual change in
readiness that might constitute a pattern of denial and deception intended
to lull an observer into a false sense of security that was intended to
bolster a clandestine movement toward generated alert. If changes were
detected, warnings could be delivered through dedicated communication
channels directly to officials and officers who possessed a series of
pre-planned responses to meet specific warnings or changes in the
opponent’s day alert posture.
This traditional use of indications and warning intelligence was facilitated
by several factors that emerged during the sustained confrontation between
the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. The likely,
and most threatening, dangers posed by the USSR were understood and
generally accepted across the Intelligence Community. The Warsaw Pact
posed a threat of a massive conventional nuclear attack across the
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inter-German border along recognized invasion corridors that permitted the
movement of large armored formations (e.g., the Fulda Gap). The Soviet
Union also posed a threat of nuclear attack by sea-based and land-based
ballistic missiles and long-range bombers following a period of force
generation that was intended to strike a devastating blow against U.S.
strategic nuclear forces, limiting the damage they could inflict against the
USSR in a retaliatory strike.
Deviations to these general threats were also identified and understood. In
Europe, analysts recognized that the Soviets might launch a ‘‘standing start’’
attack under the guise of a large exercise without placing the entire Warsaw
Pact on generated alert, seeking to capitalize on the element of surprise in a
mad dash to the English Channel. In the strategic nuclear realm, the Soviets
also retained the capability of launching a ‘‘bolt-from-the blue’’ attack by
utilizing capabilities available on day alert in an effort to destroy a
significant portion of the U.S. nuclear force caught on its bases in a day
alert posture. But even these ‘‘day alert’’ deviations in Soviet strategy were
subjected to indications and warning analysis. Analysts not only monitored
signs that the Soviets were generating their forces to launch an all-out
attack, they also searched for evidence that the Soviets were preparing to
launch standing start or bolt-from-the-blue attacks from a day alert
posture. Indications and warning methodologies were institutionalized by
developing standard procedures within the Intelligence Community and
pre-planned responses to warnings issued across dedicated communication
channels. A conscious effort was made to get within the opponent’s
‘‘decision and operation cycle,’’ so that a response to warning could
actually outpace the other side’s preparations for attack.
The fact that large forces faced each other across the Cold War divide
actually facilitated indications and warning intelligence because even small
changes in their alert status tended to generate signals that were not easily
concealed or ignored. Sustained interaction and collection and analysis
activities over decades also led to a deep understanding of what actually
constituted a normal ‘‘day alert’’ posture. Conventional and strategic arms
control negotiations facilitated understanding of the opponent’s doctrines
and standard operating procedures by increasing transparency. The fact
that both sides also relied on similar military technology produced an
abundance of technical and operational expertise that enhanced the
analytical process—U.S. Army officers with experience in armored
operations, for instance, provided a ready supply of technical and
operational knowledge when seeking to understand Soviet armored
operations and doctrine. Because both countries relied on large
bureaucracies to produce their military capabilities, organizational
behavior provided an additional commonality in practices and procedures
that were easily recognizable across the ideological divide of the Cold War.
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That ‘‘bureaucratic politics’’ was a major area of practical and theoretical
interest within the U.S. academic and policymaking communities during the
1960s and 1970s was no coincidence because it did much to explain
operational, procurement, and doctrinal forces that shaped the activities
and initiatives of military organizations.2 Organizational behavior was the
dominant explanation used to account for ‘‘irrational consistency’’ on the
part of Soviet military organizations in the face of a changing political,
strategic and technological environment.3 The shared history of strategic
interaction that emerged during the Cold War also facilitated indications
and warning intelligence because it created reference points that could be
used as a benchmark for Soviet responses to various kinds of incidents,
creating a basis for diplomatic and military-to-military contacts that
increased transparency into Moscow’s motives and alert decisions. The fact
that the analytic assumptions behind the assessment of Soviet procurement
decisions, day alert postures, and doctrine were subjected to sustained
academic, intelligence, and policy debate guaranteed that the basis of
indications and warning methodologies were subjected to continuous
revision and refinement.
THE CONTEMPORARY SETTING
Since the end of the Cold War, indications and warning intelligence has no
longer been a leading element of the tradecraft employed by the U.S.
Intelligence Community, although it is still highlighted as an important
analytical technique by leading intelligence scholars and practitioners.4
This probably relates to the fact that indications and warning intelligence
is apparently linked to its Cold War applications, and seems unsuited in
the minds of many to address current threats posed by non-state actors or
rogue regimes whose behavior appears highly unpredictable and difficult to
track using existing collection techniques.
Two objections are often mentioned in negative assessments of the ability
of indications and warning methodologies to address contemporary threats.
First, contemporary threats, especially those posed by non-state actors, are
sometimes said to fail to generate signals of sufficient strength, novelty, or
significance to be subjected to analysis using traditional indications and
warning techniques. Admittedly, the signals generated by a clandestine
terrorist cell that is about to launch an attack are different than the signals
created by several armored corps as they move out of their bases towards
forward attack positions. Nevertheless, terrorist organizations or criminal
syndicates also generate discernible signals when they too shift from day
alert to generated alert in the days and weeks proceeding an actual
operation. The Intelligence Community can discern these signals. As the
9=11 Commission Report stated, the ‘‘system’’ was ‘‘blinking red’’ in the
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summer of 2001, highlighting the fact that intelligence officials and
policymakers had detected a significant change in al-Qaeda’s operations
that suggested that an action, directed against the airline industry, was
increasingly likely.5 Even before the 11 September 2001 (9=11) terror
attacks against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, the Intelligence
Community was capable of monitoring changes in the status of terrorist
organizations and other non-state actors.
Second, the belief is that the threats posed by non-state actors are so novel
and unpredictable that identifying likely avenues, methods, and targets of
attack is impossible. In other words, unlike the Cold War, where invasion
corridors were known and the nature of the danger seemed obvious, the
threats posed by non-state actors now appear too diabolical and
innovative to be anticipated in advance. But the idea that intelligence
analysts and policymakers lack the requisite imagination to anticipate
probable threats is also a bit of a red herring. The motives and modus
operandi of clandestine networks are usually well known, and are
sometimes even announced by non-state actors who wish to bolster
political support for their objectives. Also true is that non-state actors’
behavior is not constrained by the standard operating procedures or
regulations of state actors that rely on bureaucracy to generate military
power. Nevertheless, the exigencies of operating clandestinely and the sheer
difficulty of undertaking significant action with limited resources channels
their behavior and initiatives along relatively predictable paths.6
Al-Qaeda’s preference for the use of explosives and its interest in targeting
transportation networks remained a feature of the organization both
before and after the 9=11 attacks.
Rationality Bias
By contrast, several less well-recognized issues have emerged that tend to
complicate the contemporary use of indications and warning techniques.
The perceptions of analysts and policymakers alike are often shaped by a
rationality bias when it comes to assessing the likelihood of some potential
threats. Often the actions of non-state actors or rogue regimes appear
‘‘hare-brained’’ or bizarre ex ante because they seem to lack either strategic
or political purpose, or appear extremely unlikely to yield significant
effects, especially against mobilized national defenses or the law
enforcement establishment.7 Analysts thus have difficulty in making a
convincing case to themselves or to policymakers that significant and
costly responses must be made to what appears to be far-fetched or
ill-conceived plans that seem to offer little prospect for success.
This perception, in turn, exacerbates a fundamental dilemma inherent in
the political decision to respond to warning. Specifically, contemporary
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threats often appear vague, probabilistic, and highly unrealistic, while the
costs of response are known, high, and certain.8 Policymakers are thus
forced to bear real political and financial costs to head off possible threats
that appear from their perspective ex ante as ludicrous or strategically
unsound for the party launching the initiative. This dilemma is
compounded by the fact that policymakers often prefer ‘‘all or nothing’’
responses to warnings—they want options that are guaranteed to head off
the threat detected by analysts. However, for analysts to supply this
guarantee is virtually impossible because indications and warning
methodologies do not yield a specific event prediction, which prevents
them from determining if a potential response will deter or defeat an
attack before it occurs.
As a result of the tradeoffs involved, policymakers sometimes adopt a
‘‘wait and see’’ attitude in responding to warnings of an apparent change
in the alert status of the operational units of non-state actors. A wait and
see attitude, however, undermines the effort to get inside the opponent’s
decision and operational cycle—a defensive response has to be undertaken
before an opponent is fully prepared to launch some initiative if
indications and warning techniques are to yield their greatest benefit.
Another issue that complicates the contemporary use of indications and
warning methodologies is the fact that non-state actors and (sophisticated)
rogue regimes are likely to direct their attacks or initiatives against the
military or security weaknesses of their opponents. This would suggest that
contemporary indications and warning methodologies must incorporate a
net assessment on the part of analysts and policymakers when it comes to
responding to changes in the alert levels of opponents’ units. In other
words, analysts and policymakers must have some awareness about the
ability of non-traditional targets and civilian infrastructure to respond
effectively to warning, and not simply assume that changes in opponents’
alert levels will meet with an appropriate response. For instance, as some
of the al-Qaeda terrorists boarded aircraft on the morning of 11 September
2001, they did draw attention on the part of airline personnel, but the
security procedures triggered were inappropriate to the threat they faced.9
Perhaps when warnings are issued to policymakers they should be
accompanied by some form of assessment as to why the increased threat is
particularly alarming, in the sense that it may be directed at targets that
are ill-prepared to deter or defeat an attack.
Benefits From Warnings
Several observations can be offered about the threats posed by emerging
non-traditional forces (i.e., terrorist cells, criminal networks, rogue
regimes) in relation to the benefits offered by indications and warning
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analysis. Compared to the signals generated by the large rival military
bureaucracies that were subjected to scrutiny during the Cold War, the
signals generated by non-state actors are limited in number and relatively
faint. At the same time, the resources available to non-state forces are also
limited compared to state elements, and their operations are constrained by
the availability of only minimal resources and the exigencies of clandestine
operations. Moreover, their operations must be undertaken on the finest of
margins because any effort to devote additional material resources or
personnel simply increases the probability of detection by opposing
intelligence agencies. Clearly, too, ideology, culture, and expertise—to say
nothing of their political agenda—make discerning their modus operandi
and operational objectives relatively easy. The fact that aggressors must
attack an opponent’s weaknesses and not its strengths in order to generate
a significant political impact can also be used as a guide to understand
likely threat vectors. When subjected to sustained collection and analysis,
monitoring the day-to-day activities of non-state actors is theoretically
possible in seeking to understand what in fact constitutes their ‘‘day alert’’
status, and to detect subtle changes in the signals they generate to warn that
they are in fact moving to a ‘‘generated alert’’ posture. In other words,
detecting the threat posed by non-state actors when compared to state
actors is somewhat more difficult. But given the more limited nature of the
threat constituted by non-state forces, the suggestion is that more limited
responses might be sufficient to deter or defeat the threats they pose.
TOWARDS A MODERN INDICATIONS AND WARNING CAPABILITY
Indications and warning methodologies are based on key concepts and
assumptions that must be understood and accepted by analysts and
policymakers. Foremost among these assumptions is that indications and
warning intelligence does not necessarily yield specific event predictions,
only indications that the threat posed by some opponent is increasing. If
commanders or policymakers insist on receiving specific details about what
is about to transpire, or responses guaranteed to head off an attack, or
compelling explanations for why an opponent is about to undertake an
extremely counterproductive initiative, then warnings are likely to yield few
positive results. If analysts wait until the situation unfolds to the point
where answers can be offered to these questions, it will likely be too late to
respond effectively. Analysts and policymakers must overcome the
dilemma inherent in indications and warning methodologies—they must
devise a way to overcome policymakers’ preference for an ‘‘all or nothing’’
response when it comes to selecting a response to warning.
Indications and warning intelligence is also based on the detection of
anomalies, which requires sustained analysis so that patterns of activity
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that reflect ‘‘normalcy’’ can be identified. In the absence of a clear conception
of expected behavior and well-defined checklists of warning indicators,
however, indications and warning methodology can still provide a valuable
service because it can serve as a way to direct scarce collection and
analytical resources towards individuals, groups, facilities, organizations,
or military units that appear to be engaging in unusual activity or that are
failing to exhibit the signals expected by normal patterns of activity.
Investigators who arrive at some facility might in fact find perfectly
innocent and compelling explanations for the emergence of some anomaly,
but anomalies require additional analysis because they offer a good way to
penetrate denial and deception techniques employed by state and non-state
actors. Detecting anomalies among individuals or groups might appear
impossible to achieve, but the al-Qaeda operatives involved in the 9=11
terror attacks left signals that were in fact detected by their flight
instructors, which were subsequently discussed within the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI). The fact that the law enforcement or intelligence
communities did not investigate why groups of foreign students from the
Middle East were interested in learning how to fly, but not necessarily
land, aircraft suggests that both analysts and policymakers alike failed to
recognize what actually constitutes raw intelligence and warning data.10
Available Threat Responses
Once anomalies are detected, policymakers must understand the range of
appropriate responses available to respond to heightened threats. At a
minimum, they need to understand that a change in defense and security
postures can derail an opponent’s plans. A change in defense posture can
deter an opponent from taking undesirable action because it can deny the
opponent the element of surprise needed to achieve a fait accompli, which
changes the strategic setting in a way that makes existing deterrent threats
less relevant. A change in security postures can also delay some nefarious
scheme concocted by a non-state force because it negates the assumptions
behind some finely crafted plan that is intended to exploit weaknesses in
day alert security procedures intended to safeguard critical infrastructure
or vulnerable aspects of civil society. Delay also provides law enforcement
with the additional time needed to investigate leads and to explore
anomalies detected in the behavior or status of non-state actors, providing
an opportunity to disrupt activities by identifying and detaining the
individuals who are key to impending operations. Because non-state
aggressors are forced to undertake operations on the finest of margins, a
change in defensive and security operations should force them to reassess
planned operations in order to guarantee their effectiveness even against
new defense postures or security procedures. In this sense, time is on the
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side of the defense forces because a ‘‘mission kill’’ provides the opportunity
for law enforcement or intelligence agencies to target key parts of the
opponent’s infrastructure, which can ultimately eliminate the threat.
Because small changes in defensive and law enforcement postures can deter
a potential attack or produce a mission kill against initiatives launched by
non-state actors, indications and warning intelligence can overcome
policymakers’ preferences for an ‘‘all or nothing’’ response to warning.
Intelligence analysts need no longer present policymakers with specific
event predictions that identify exactly what is about to unfold or offer a
compelling explanation for why an opponent is about to undertake some
actions that appear ex ante as strategically ill-advised or self-destructive.
Instead of requiring policymakers to adopt costly and extreme responses to
potential threats, analysts have to request only relatively modest changes
in defense and security postures to deny the opponent the element of
surprise, or to derail an opponent’s plans that are crafted to meet specific
strategic settings. By reducing the anticipated costs of a response to
potential threats, intelligence analysts can increase the probability that
policymakers will undertake changes in defense and security postures
needed to deter or derail threats. For example, a modest change in airline
security procedures before the 9=11 terror attacks might have forced the
al-Qaeda operatives to reevaluate their plans to ensure that they would not
run afoul of airline security. The Japanese fleet moving towards Pearl
Harbor in December 1941 had instructions to abandon its operations if it
lost the element of surprise. Ultimately, indications and warning
techniques offer the possibility of deterring attack by increasing defensive
readiness, a metric that might constitute a new ‘‘holy grail’’ for intelligence
professionals.
OVERCOMING STUMBLING BLOCKS
Indications and warning methodologies comprise a significant tool that
offers important ways to organize strategic responses to today’s threats.
Together they offer important insights into collection techniques,
suggesting the importance of long-term research in developing a broad
awareness of emerging threats. They also offer a way to direct more
focused collection efforts to investigate anomalies in the known patterns of
behavior of both state and non-state actors. For analysts, indications and
warning methodologies also offer a way to defeat an opponent’s efforts at
denial and deception by highlighting the collection and analytical
techniques needed to investigate and explore anomalies that emerge.
Indications and warning methodologies also offer a way to overcome
response dilemmas and the general reluctance of policymakers to incur
substantial and known costs in response to possible threats that appear
560 JAMES J. WIRTZ





































ex ante as unrealistic or ill advised. In effect, indications and warning
methodologies offer a strategic way to organize national intelligence and
response efforts across the entire intelligence, defense and security enterprise.
Although indications and warning methodologies offer a constructive
response to today’s security challenges, they have clearly have fallen out of
fashion among intelligence professionals. In part, indications and warning
is often viewed as better suited to a different setting—the prominence of the
technique during the Cold War might make it appear as unresponsive to
present circumstances. As a result, intelligence managers and policymakers
have failed to consider how indications and warning techniques can be
applied to meet today’s challenges. Another stumbling block is the fact that
indications and warning methodologies have to be implemented across the
entire intelligence cycle—collection, analysis, and response—in order to be
effective. Because few mechanisms are available to organize and inform
both intelligence professionals and government officials about their roles in
the indications and warning process, indications and warning is unlikely to
experience a resurgence as a key instrument of intelligence and strategic
policy.
The failure to consider and apply indications and warning methodologies
in the effort to exploit the opportunities for collection and analysis created by
the information revolution is especially unfortunate. Nevertheless,
indications and warning remains as an important and effective tool in the
national effort to avoid surprise, and to deter opponents who seek to
exploit defense and security weaknesses to achieve their objectives.
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